Political geographers draw distinctions in English between
were thoroughly secularized and in civil society the Church comprised one of many forms of free association. For Vermeil Alsace was part of France but stood apart from France because the laws of the Third Republic, including the Law of Separation of Church and State of 1905, which had shut down religious education, had not been applied to Alsace when reintegrated into France in 1919 . 4 Vermeil feared that the degree of autonomy, which French officials had permitted Alsace, would drive it from France and draw it to Germany. The
Maginot line -a massive network of bunkers, fortresses, and tunnels dug into the Alsatian plain since 1919 had created a defensive frontier in depth against
Germany, but Vermeil feared that the frontières invisibles or in German the "unsichtbare Grenzen" (invisible borders) or "die Grenzen im Kopf" (mental borders) would continue to separate the Alsatians from their French national identity. briefly from my thirty years of research in the Upper Rhine valley, but the bulk of this presentation will be a macro-historical overview of the inter-related development of nations, borders, and states in pre-modern Europe -a process which has come to justify walled borders whether visible or invisible. I offer this approach because belief in the normative character of nations, borders, and states in geo-political discourse remains quite influential. What I share may already be well known to many of you, but I would hope that this historical overview offers a helpful context for the other papers from this symposium.
I. Theoretical models: State, Nation, and Borders
War is the most dynamic force of historical change. Armies depopulate the countryside, devastate towns, disrupt economic relations, and scatter refugees to the winds. Peace treaties redraw political boundaries turning neighbors into foreigners and strangers into compatriots. Scholars in political geography argue that the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the Peace of Westphalia that concluded it served as the nursery of the modern "post-Westphalian" state, a form of political organization that assigns legal sovereignty over a broad and impermeable territorial space to a centralized political body at the expense of local authorities and in contrast to and often conflict with other sovereign territorial states whose boundaries are contiguous to it. 6 Once conceptually grounded in this first European-wide treaty, the model became the norm in interdynastic European politics and then spread with European power across the globe.
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In the nineteenth century when the academic disciplines of history and geography became professionalized, scholars in political history and political geography came to treat the post-Westphalian state as an autonomous subjectto reify the state or even to anthropomorphize it -animating and legitimating the will of the state as the self-conscious mask for the will of those in power within it. 8 We might reflect on the problems that this normative assumption has presented to international agencies seeking to intervene in the now sovereign Sudans, or the obstacles to mustering the collective international will to interfere even in "failed states." Moreover, a second assumption that the sovereign state is the territorial unit in mapping the globe has meant that in modern times the state has been the only legitimate player in international relations. These assumptions have reinforced each other and have formed the core of modern analyses of the state; however, the growing role of non-state actors in international relations, from Doctors without Borders, to multi-national corporations, to terrorist organizations, suggests that the modern state is one historical construct for global political relations rather than the normative form for political systems.
In his recent book, the historian, Daniel Nexon, has argued that power politics involves an interplay between various institutions of which the state is only one possible configuration. His analytical approach, which he calls "relational institutionalism," shifts focus away from states as the unique legitimate entity in international relations and sees all institutions, including states, as networks of social relations of power. 9 Post-modern political geographers have also come to analyze states "not as autonomous subjects but as processes of subject-making" in which the claim to sovereignty justified by whatever legitimate authority -God or the people -provided political cover for territorial acquisition and state-building by power elites. 10 These processes become clearer when we examine early modern history as states and nations acquired their normative cloaks.
Following the Peace of Westphalia, the state-building power elites were the noble agents of monarchical dynasties, who used the princes' claims to sovereignty by divine right over their subjects to build "absolutist" states. 11 As the eighteenth century progressed, claims to sovereignty by kings and the noble privileges that sustained them came under attack by competing political values, which championed the source of sovereignty in the people as a reified and often anthropomorphized body called "the nation." 12 In a great and bloody revolutionary struggle that began in 1789 and extended through much of the nineteenth century, the nation overthrew the king as the perceived legitimate source of sovereignty, even in states that retained kings, and the modern nationstate emerged. 13 The political agents for this victory were nationalists who according to John Breuilly legitimized their claims with three axioms:
1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. Jewish law all Jewish men were equal. When they failed to maintain their covenant, God providentially intervened and deprived them of their sovereignty over the Promised Land, and they had to wait for a messiah to restore that kingdom. This is the classic story of a nation.
We now know that ancient Jewish scribes created or at least refashioned much of this history -including Abraham and maybe even Moses -when they reconstructed the Torah during the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century BCE. 30 The Jews, who actually conquered the Promised Land, were a hodgepodge of extended clans, who followed their conquest by intermarriage and integration, eventually consolidating into kingdoms. In the wake of the political collapse of those kingdoms, the scribes associated the demise of the kingdoms of Israel and Judea with Jewish acculturation with Canaanites and Philistines.
These scribes called for communal purity to restore the kingdom, and to support this goal they reconstructed their history with a pure line of descent from
Abraham through Moses to themselves as Prophets. 31 The seminal place of the The Greeks reserved a special antipathy and violence for fellow Greeks and enslaved them when they could. The broader and, what nineteenth-century writers saw as, the national sense of "Greek-ness" (Pan-Hellenism) emerged in the wake of war with the Persian Empire and was enshrined and calcified in literature -although not as often believed by Herodotus. 35 The Greeks -or rather the Athenians -saw in their victory a superiority of language and culture, lumping together the highly sophisticated Persians with other non-Greek speakers as "barbarians" defined initially by how they spoke. Barbarism in its full sense, however, implied a dichotomy to Greek-ness, which could not be undone by learning to speak Greek. Benjamin Isaac has argued that defining barbarism carried with it an early discourse of racism. 36 Whether his assertion is true or not, Asia was a source of myths for Greeks to define themselves against. In the wake of the Persian wars, Greek authors recalled the myth of Europa, an Asian princess from Tyre, who was abducted by Zeus/Greeks, raped, and abandoned selected members from the community of "oath swearers" as temporary representatives of their collective will. 51 Both models spelled out a code of conduct for their adherents, though neither accurately depicted political reality.
Communal assemblies generated hierarchies, and royal charters called on the community of the realm as often as on divine authority.
Medieval states were assemblies of people, identified in the sources as gens, populus, or natio, where invisible borders separated members from nonmembers; 52 nevertheless, the Europeans were also beginning to think territorially. 53 As with models of sovereignty, boundaries began to define the European landscape from above and below. The medieval church was the first European political institution to define its authority territorially. Beginning in the Carolingian era, church officials divided Europe's religious landscape into diocese and parishes, whose boundaries encompassed legal authority and regulated tax collection through tithes. 54 At the Treaty of Verdun in 843, the noble advisors for Charlemagne's three warring grandsons were able to draw up surprisingly precise boundaries for the three kingdoms, though Lothar's middle kingdom, which included Alsace, would eventually be conquered and partitioned by his brothers' successors in the French and German kingdoms to the west and east. 55 Nevertheless, the most significant push for borders came from below.
Towns and villages built walls to defend themselves and regulate commerce.
Villagers laid out boundary stones to claim usufruct of forests and fields, and peasants referred to landmarks in defining their strips of plough-land. Medieval borders first emerged to delineate private and collective properties and to mark the jurisdictional limits of lordship. 56 In the feudal political system control over justice was the source of power; over time these jurisdictional boundaries would gel to fashion firmer, if invisible, boundaries between lordships, counties, duchies, and ultimately kingdoms.
By the age of the Reformation, Europe's principalities, as the predecessors of the post-Westphalian state, were composite assemblies of distinct legal bodies bound to the king by inter-personal contracts. The character and scope of sovereignty varied from region to region within the dynastic domain. 57 Early modern states functioned through networks of aristocratic families bound together by personal ties rather than through institutional structures. Royal councils, central and regional law courts, and fiscal chambers would eventually provide the skeleton of a state, but the human muscle that moved it responded to other neurological stimuli than modern bureaucrats.
Politics entailed a welding of private interest onto royal service. Officials treated their posts as personal property, allocated to them as members of a distinct and privileged class. They governed through a distribution of favors, both personal and official, and by calling in debts and obligations from clients. Devotion to a superior and generosity to subordinates were honorable and ethical traits.
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These aristocratic elites envisioned themselves as the community of the realm, and they jealously defended the "public" interest, which meant their collective private rights grounded in local and regional properties. 59 To be effective in this system, rulers had to play a double game, first to employ networks of social relations across institutional borders through regional power brokers to realize regal will but then also to maintain power by preserving regional and social distinctions to prevent consolidated resistance from their subjects. in pamphlets and broadsheets to a broader yet still linguistically circumscribed imagined community of believers. 62 The Word of God, preached and printed in the vernacular, was central to all Protestant denominations, and the growing demand for vernacular publications dried up the market for Latin texts, in time even in Catholic regions, and relegated many regional mother tongues to dialects. 63 In the century and a half before the Reformation, the papacy had barely weathered a schism that had cost it much of its political clout. Fifteenthcentury popes signed concordats with various European princes that gave those princes significant control over ecclesiastical institutions and officials within their domains. As a result individual cities, duchies, and kingdoms responded to the call for Reformation differently. Some embraced specific territorial Protestant confessions, while even princes who remained Catholic did so on their own terms, embracing Papal-centric Tridentine Catholicism, belatedly, partially, or not at all, creating -if you will -territorial "Catholicisms." 64 The initial round of religious wars fought within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation resulted in stalemate embodied in the religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which granted the Empire's lay princes the right to determine the official faith of their subjects, later encapsulated under the phrase, cuius regio eius religio.
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As Vermeil noted in his critique of Alsatian German-ness, this new model of religious politics bound the emerging state to a Christianizing mission, which modern Reformation scholars refer to as confessionalization; that is, enforced religious conformity by the authorities on fellow citizens or subjects. 66 Those subjects, who could not accept the prince's religion, could claim the ius emigrandi (the right to emigrate), and became Europe's first political refugees.
the Inquisition enforced religious conformity in the Spanish kingdoms, while in England Henry VIII's successors assumed the title Supreme Governor of the Church of England. In France after a series of bitter and bloody religious civil wars, Henry IV converted to Catholicism and signed the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which granted religious rights to a Protestant minority -the Huguenotsconfined to certain regions of the kingdom. In all, the latter sixteenth and early seventeenth century saw "confessional cleansing" drive religious minorities, as communities of faith, out of many kingdoms and smaller territories or into small enclaves. 68 The Reformation thus not only concentrated sovereign power in the hands of the monarch at the expense of regional interests, but also created imagined communities of faith circumscribed spatially by print vernaculars and increasingly engaged in the political process.
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In 1618 a religious rebellion of the regional, Bohemian, Czech-speaking with each territorial component normally entitled to "ancient" rights and privileges.
The Austrian Habsburgs faced linguistic and religious barriers in ruling a dynastic empire that included Italian-, Flemish-, and Hungarian-speaking elites and peasants who spoke a bewildering array of Slavic tongues, and so they still relied on Latin as the common administrative language. 80 The German-speaking ruler of the United Kingdom, George I (*1715-27), governed Gaelic speaking Scotland and Ireland by negotiating with "national" parliaments at Edinburgh and Dublin. 81 Even the model absolute monarch, Louis XIV, had to appeal to provincial estates to authorize new taxes and to register laws. He also recognized independent foreign enclaves, such as the duchy of Lorraine and the papal county of Venaissin surrounding Avignon, within the "natural frontiers" of France that he had waged a half-century of war to attain.
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Whatever the territorial vision cherished by the monarchy or the growing consciousness of the scope of the state among elites, the bulk of the common folk lived their entire lives within twenty miles of their birthplace. This was their
Heimat or their pays, and beyond the invisible boundaries of perceived homeland people were Fremde or étrangers -a term still in use today. They spoke a Babel of mother tongues -local dialects learned from their mothers, which quickly identified them as highlanders, or southerners, or Florentines. 83 As Eugene
Weber has argued the peasants would not become Frenchmen until deep into the nineteenth-century. 84 The awakening of national consciousness had to begin with the eighteenth-century elites. The spread of print vernaculars helped further fashion a self-conscious audience who could draw on history to imagine a political community of Frenchmen or
Germans, but such imaginings resonated differently among distinct ethnic communities in the early modern composite states. 87 The wars of religion had also added the possibility of legitimate resistance to the despotic rule of princes who oppressed confessional minorities, divinely justified in these communities of faith by the example of the biblical Jewish covenant.
In mid seventeenth-century England, what began as a religious struggle between Parliament and the king led to a crisis of political legitimacy. 88 Who had a right to rule? Both sides laid claim to that right in a social contract with the people. Derived from feudal traditions, the royal contract was not between equals, but the parliamentary model -later articulated by John Locke -posited a state of nature in which equal men formed the political community and set the framework for civil government. This community was not defined by ethnic bonds nor by religious conformity, which appeared to have been the king's goal, but rather by civility and willingness to sacrifice some private interests to share in the commonwealth of public affairs (res publica). 89 Rumor had it that one French pilot had flown too close to the German border and ditched his jet in the Rhine rather than enter "enemy" air space. I tell this story not because I believe that it is true, but rather because Alsatians enjoyed telling the story and the bombing practice was real. 
